Grave in Mexico or prison cell in the US

Antonio Ocaranza Fernández

In less than six months, the Mexican government has handed over fifty-five organized crime leaders to the United States. Twenty-nine were handed over in February and twenty-six in August, including Rafael Caro Quintero, Abigael González Valencia, “El Cuini,” and Servando Gómez Martínez, “La Tuta,” emblematic criminal operators.

To carry out these extraditions, the Mexican government innovated. It did not use the usual extradition process, but rather a mechanism provided for in the National Security Law, which has allowed it to act expeditiously and avoid appeals and lengthy legal proceedings that often hinder the transfer of criminals abroad.

1. Low political cost. In public debate, it is difficult to defend sending criminal leaders to face justice abroad. Furthermore, the criminals who were handed over were already in custody and lacked social support or allies who posed a threat. With this, the government shows that it was effective when it arrested the criminals and that now, with the United States, it has been effective, firm, and collaborative.
2. Dismantling criminal structures in prisons. Mexican authorities can argue that the extraditions will benefit the population because it is well known that criminals continue to operate, give instructions, and commit crimes even from prison. Although it may be difficult for the government to demonstrate that the extraditions have led to a reduction in crime, public opinion will hope that they contribute in some way to improving security.
3. Contrast with AMLO. The handover allows President Sheinbaum to put her own stamp on her security policy and collaboration with Trump, distancing herself from the “hugs not bullets” approach that characterized her predecessor.
4. Cushioning Trump’s pressure. Considering the Aztec history of human sacrifices to appease Huitzilopochtli, many Mexicans support the handing over of criminals as an offering to satisfy Trump’s hunger, thus avoiding tariff sanctions or military action against cartels on Mexican territory.
5. The anti-judicial offensive. The Mexican government is using the handover to fuel the narrative against corrupt judges and justify its actions outside traditional channels. But when the newly elected judges take office and the new judicial system comes into effect, the government will have trouble arguing legal flaws.
6. Demonstrative deterrent effect. The extraditions send a clear message to criminal organizations: if you commit a crime, you could end up in a US prison. This effect has already left its mark on Colombia’s recent history, where extradition helped dismantle powerful cartels, although it also unleashed a wave of violence by the group known as Los Extraditables, which shook the entire country.

In Mexico, the surrender of organized crime leaders has not generated strong reactions, partly because they were already in custody and no longer posed a security risk. However, it cannot be ruled out that violence could erupt with the capture and attempted extradition to the United States of drug trafficking leaders who are currently wanted and for whom the US justice system is offering substantial rewards, such as Nemesio Oseguera, El Mencho, leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel; Juan José Farias Álvarez, “El Abuelo,” leader of Carteles Unidos; and Nicolás Sierra Santana, “El Gordo,” leader of Los Viagras.

In short, the extradition of organized crime leaders appears to be part of Mexico’s strategy, calculated and executed to achieve political, diplomatic, and security objectives.

But its effectiveness will depend on two factors. First, that there are enough big fish in Mexican prisons to continue appeasing US demands. And second, that the Mexican government accepts the political cost of arresting and handing over to the US cartel leaders who, in collusion with civil and military authorities, currently control several regions of the country, and whose capture could lead to an increase in violence and expose the cesspool of corruption that explains why these drug lords remain untouchable.

The least desirable and most threatening scenario is that, as in Colombia, an alliance of cartels is formed under the slogan “We prefer a grave in Mexico to a cell in the United States.”